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Informal Avenues of Influence

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Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics ((PASTPRPO))

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the actual coordination and decision-making between the president and the prime minister. The analysis covers agenda-setting initiatives, public opinion and party system dynamics, and the way formal prerogatives are interpreted into praxis, as well as how the key actors approach coordination where there is no explicit constitutional or judicial guidance. The findings confirm that lack of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination opens the door for presidential activism (Lithuania and particularly Romania), whereas under stronger coordination mechanisms, presidents are in turn more constrained and constructively involved in decision-making (Finland).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Maria Gestrin-Hagner and Sylvia Bjon, Regeringsordförandena i krismöte—presidenten kritisk till Sannfinländarnas regimskifte, Hufvudstadsbladet, 11 June 2017, https://www.hbl.fi/artikel/sauli-niinisto-kritisk-till-regimskiftet-i-sannfinlandarna-regeringskrisen-overskuggar-gullrandadi/

  2. 2.

    President Sauli Niinistö reveals differences with Prime Minister Sipilä over dissolving government, Yle, 13 July 2017, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/president_sauli_niinisto_reveals_differences_with_primeminister_sipila_over_dissolving_govt/9721085

  3. 3.

    Information on the president’s speeches, press releases, and other activities is available at the website of the presidential office (http://www.tpk.fi).

  4. 4.

    Politiikan suunnitteluun ei tarvita uutta, presidenttivetoista raidetta, Helsingin Sanomat, 10 February 2018.

  5. 5.

    When the possibility of government resignation surfaced in June 2018, President Niinistö commented that dissolution of the Sipilä cabinet would not automatically result in early elections. Niinistö said that he would first hear the views of the Eduskunta parties to find out whether it would be possible to form a new government. Marko Junkkari, Presidentti Sauli Niinistö: Hallituksen mahdollinen eronpyyntö ei välttämättä tarkoittaisi uusia vaaleja, Helsingin Sanomat, 6 June 2018.

  6. 6.

    According to Meres-Wuori (2014: 225), the two sides have held joint meetings since 1969. While President Halonen met both the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, the Foreign Affairs Committee complained on several occasions that it is kept in the dark about the president’s activities in external relations. See, for example, Pertti Salolainen, Tieto ulkopolitiikasta ei kulje eduskuntaan, Helsingin Sanomat, 18 January 2010.

  7. 7.

    Laki tasavallan presidentin kansliasta 100/2012, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2012/20120100

  8. 8.

    The affair concerned leaked emails between Grybauskaité and Eligijus Masiulis, the former leader of the Liberal Movement who had been implicated in a political corruption investigation. Published correspondence dated from 2014 to 2016 and discussed a variety of politically sensitive issues such as court nominations, the 2016 parliamentary elections and who the president would like to be chosen as the prime minister, and warnings about Skvernelis’ political ambitions and the president’s description of him as a ‘dangerous populist’ (Park 2018b).

  9. 9.

    Following the first presidential elections in 1993 the cabinet of Bronislovas Lubys resigned in order to enable the president to form the new government. However, the Constitutional Court ruled in early 1998 that the government resigns only upon elections to the Seimas. See “The ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 January 1998, On the programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania”, http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1119/summary

  10. 10.

    Having been forced to appoint the new Social Democratic-led coalition that included the Labour Party, Grybauskaité expressed her frustration through refusing to attend the opening of the Seimas, sending instead her written greetings. There were also accusations of electoral fraud by the Labour Party and Grybauskaité asked the Constitutional Court to investigate the matter.

  11. 11.

    Commenting on Grybauskaité after the first round of the 2014 presidential elections, Kestutis Girnius, a political scientist at the Vilnius Institute of International Relations and Political Science, remarked that “people in Lithuania like her style, the outwardly projected toughness, resoluteness, her willingness to subject any minister to a talk-down”. Andrius Sytas, Lithuanian president faces second round in elections, Reuters, 12 May 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-election/lithuanian-president-faces-second-round-in-elections-idUSBREA4B00920140512

  12. 12.

    Information on the president’s speeches, press releases, and other activities is available at the website of the president (http://www.lrp.lt/lt).

  13. 13.

    The document is available in English at https://www.antena3.ro/en/politics/there-is-the-text-of-the-cooperation-agreement-between-president-basescu-and-prime-minister-ponta-196712.html

  14. 14.

    Interestingly, the document also outlined the primary decision-making mechanism for solving conflicts: “The decision making formula between the two components of the Executive, the Presidency and the Romanian Government resides primarily in the meeting or the direct discussion President_Premier. Exceptionally, other persons could be involved, with the prior acceptance of the two, or a topic could be delegated to the administrative system of the two institutions—advisers, technical staff.”

  15. 15.

    Carmen Paun, Romanian president calls on prime minister to resign, Politico, 27 April 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/klaus-iohannis-viorica-dancila-romania-president-calls-on-prime-minister-to-resign/

  16. 16.

    Andrew Rettman, Romanian leaders trade jibes over upcoming EU presidency, EUobserver, 12 November 2018, https://euobserver.com/institutional/143357

  17. 17.

    http://www.presidency.ro/en/commitments/president-klaus-iohannis-country-project

  18. 18.

    Information on the president’s speeches and other activities is available at http://www.presidency.ro/en

  19. 19.

    The Constitutional Court has also ruled that it is legal for the president to maintain such ties to parties: “the Constitution does not forbid the President to maintain his relationships with the political party that provided him support throughout the elections or with any other political parties. Such a ban would not be in the spirit of the Constitution if the President is elected based on a direct, individual vote, owing to his political agenda and if he is accountable to his constituencies for the fulfillment of this program. It is obvious that in order to put in practice his program, the President may carry out a dialogue with the political party whose member he used to be or with a completely different political party that could provide support in terms of the implementation of this program.” Advisory Opinion no. 1/2007, published in the Official Journal no. 258/18 April 2007 (Tănăsescu 2008). Two other court decisions also deal with this issue. Decision no. 53/2005 and Decision no. 284/2014 stated that “the President’s right to express political opinions arguing in accordance with his political program or to militate in order to materialize these opinions is not contrary to the constitutional interdiction regarding the membership of a political party” (Gherghina et al. 2016: 5).

  20. 20.

    Advisory Opinion no. 1/2007, published in the Official Journal no. 258/18 April 2007.

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Raunio, T., Sedelius, T. (2020). Informal Avenues of Influence. In: Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16431-7_5

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