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Abstract

In this paper, we present a novel method for the verification of security protocols time properties using SMT-based bounded model checking (SMT-BMC). In our approach, we model protocol users’ behaviours using networks of synchronized timed automata. Suitably specified correctness properties are defined as reachability property of some, chosen states in automata network. We consider most important time properties of protocols’ executions using specially constructed time conditions. These are checked by a quantifier-free SMT encoding and SMT solver using BMC algorithms. In our work, we have also implemented the proposed method and evaluated it for four, well-known security protocols. We also compared our new SMT-based technique with the corresponding SAT-based approach.

The project financed under the program of the Minister of Science and Higher Education under the name “Regional Initiative of Excellence” in 2019–2022 project number 020/RID/2018/19, the amount of financing 12,000,000 PLN.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Syntax of NSPK timed version in Common Language is as follow: \( \alpha _1 \) \(A \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(\{T_A,I_A\}_{K_B}\); \( \alpha _2 \) \(B \rightarrow A\) \( :\) \(\{T_A,T_B\}_{K_A}\); \( \alpha _3 \) \(A \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(\{T_B\}_{K_B}\).

  2. 2.

    Syntax of WLP timed version in Common Language is as follow: \( \alpha _1 \) \(A \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(I_A\); \( \alpha _2 \) \(B \rightarrow A\) \( :\) \(T_B\); \( \alpha _3 \) \(A \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(\{T_B\}_{K_{AS}}\); \( \alpha _4 \) \(B \rightarrow S\) \( :\) \(\{I_A, \{N_B\}_{K_{AS}}\}_{K_{BS}}\); \( \alpha _5 \) \(S \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(\{T_B\}_{K_{BS}}\).

  3. 3.

    Syntax of WMF timed version in Common Language is as follow: \( \alpha _1 \) \(A \rightarrow S\) \( :\) \(I_A,\{T_A,I_B,K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}}\); \( \alpha _2 \) \(S \rightarrow B\) \( :\) \(\{T_S,I_A,K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\).

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Zbrzezny, A.M., Szymoniak, S., Kurkowski, M. (2020). Efficient Verification of Security Protocols Time Properties Using SMT Solvers. In: Martínez Álvarez, F., Troncoso Lora, A., Sáez Muñoz, J., Quintián, H., Corchado, E. (eds) International Joint Conference: 12th International Conference on Computational Intelligence in Security for Information Systems (CISIS 2019) and 10th International Conference on EUropean Transnational Education (ICEUTE 2019). CISIS ICEUTE 2019 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 951. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20005-3_3

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