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Attempting to Reduce Susceptibility to Fraudulent Computer Pop-Ups Using Malevolence Cue Identification Training

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Advances in Human Factors in Cybersecurity (AHFE 2019)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 960))

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Abstract

People accept a high number of computer pop-ups containing cues that indicate malevolence when they occur as interrupting tasks during a cognitively demanding memory-based task [1, 2], with younger adults spending only 5.5ā€“6-s before making an accept or decline decision [2]. These findings may be explained by at least three factors: pressure to return to the suspended task to minimize forgetting; adopting non-cognitively demanding inspection strategies; and, having low levels of suspicion [3]. Consequences of such behavior could be potentially catastrophic for individuals and organizations (e.g., in the event of a successful cyber breach), and thus it is crucial to develop effective interventions to reduce susceptibility. The current experiment (Nā€‰=ā€‰50) tested the effectiveness of malevolence cue identification training (MCIT) interventions. During phase 1, participants performed a serial recall task with some trials interrupted by pop-up messages with accept or cancel options that either contained cues (e.g., missing company name, misspelt word) to malevolence (malevolent condition) or no cues (non-malevolent condition). In phase 2, participants were allocated to one of three groups: no MCIT/Control, non-incentivized MCIT/N-IMCIT, or incentivized MCIT/IMCIT. Control group participants only had to identify category-related words (e.g., colors). Participants in intervention conditions were explicitly made aware of the malevolence cues in Phase 1 pop-ups before performing trying to identify malevolence cues within adapted passages of text. The N-IMCIT group were told that their detection accuracy was being ranked against other participants, to induce social comparison. Phase 3 was similar to phase 1, although 50% of malevolent pop-ups contained new cues. MCIT did lead to a significant reduction in the number of malevolent pop-ups accepted under some conditions. Incentivized training did not (statistically) improve performance compared to non-incentivized training. Cue novelty had no effect. Ways of further improving the MCIT training protocol used, as well as theoretical implications, are discussed.

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Correspondence to Phillip L. Morgan .

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Morgan, P.L., Soteriou, R., Williams, C., Zhang, Q. (2020). Attempting to Reduce Susceptibility to Fraudulent Computer Pop-Ups Using Malevolence Cue Identification Training. In: Ahram, T., Karwowski, W. (eds) Advances in Human Factors in Cybersecurity. AHFE 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 960. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20488-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20488-4_1

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