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Friends with Benefits? NATO and the European Neutral/Non-aligned States

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Small States and the New Security Environment

Part of the book series: The World of Small States ((WSS,volume 7))

Abstract

Europe’s neutral and non-aligned states (the N-5) are not NATO members, but they have maintained a mutually beneficial relationship as partners of the Alliance through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Various historical, geographical and domestic causes explain their military neutrality or non-alignment, but the N-5 have made important contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peace support missions, military exercises and training programmes since joining the PfP in the 1990s. This arrangement was largely sufficient for the security concerns of the 1990s and 2000s, but it has come under increasing scrutiny during the last decade due to regional changes in the security environment. The Arab Spring, the migration crisis, and Russian revanchism dramatically altered the European security environment throughout the 2010s. This chapter explores whether these events have precipitated a change in attitude amongst the N-5 towards seeking the shelter of NATO and assesses the challenges and realistic opportunities for closer engagement between these states and the Alliance. It finds that while membership is not realistically on the horizon for any of the N-5, opportunities to improve current arrangements exist.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, Tonra (2012), p. 224; Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi (2016), pp. 59–60; Reinprecht and Latcheva (2003), p. 439; Wylie (2002), p. 332; Malmberg (2001), pp. 198–199.

  2. 2.

    Petersson (2011), p. 121.

  3. 3.

    Cottey (2007), pp. 32–36.

  4. 4.

    NATO, Strategic Concept 1991, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm [accessed 18-05-18].

  5. 5.

    See Betz (2004), p. 32.

  6. 6.

    Summary from Petersson, “NATO and the EU “Neutrals,” 113. For the original text, see: NATO, Partnership for Peace: Framework Document (January 1994), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm [accessed 10-05-18].

  7. 7.

    See, Ferreira-Pereira (2007), p. 207.

  8. 8.

    EU European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world [accessed 21-05-18].

  9. 9.

    Dan Griffin, “Russian aircraft entered Irish controlled airspace – IAA”, The Irish Times, 19 February 2015.

  10. 10.

    Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 8 July 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08/eu-nato-joint-declaration/ [accessed 09-05-18].

  11. 11.

    Government of the Swiss Confederation, “Foreign and security policy – a targeted partnership”, https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-eu-brussels/en/home/key-issues/foreign-security-policy.html [accessed 04-02-19].

  12. 12.

    Alyson et al. (2016), pp. 9–26.

  13. 13.

    NATO, KFOR: Key Facts and Figures (February 2018), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/20180213_2018-02-KFOR-Placemat-final.pdf; and NATO, RSM: Key Facts and Figures (December 2018), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_12/20181203_2018-12-RSM-Placemat.pdf [accessed 04-02-19].

  14. 14.

    See, NATO, NATO Response Force (NRF), https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49755.htm# [accessed 28-05-18].

  15. 15.

    See, NATO, Strategic Aircraft Capability (SAC), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50105.htm [accessed 28-05-18].

  16. 16.

    NATO, Partnership Interoperability Initiative, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_132726.htm [accessed 21-05-18].

  17. 17.

    NORDEFCO, The basics about NORDEFCO, http://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco [accessed 21-05-18].

  18. 18.

    The Northern Group consists of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

  19. 19.

    Finnish Ministry of Defence, Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden, https://www.defmin.fi/files/4247/Trilateral_Statement_of_Intent.pdf [accessed 29-05-18].

  20. 20.

    Nünlist (2018), pp. 192–202.

  21. 21.

    Andrew Cottey, “Ireland and NATO: A Distinctly Low-Profile Partnership”, in Cottey, ed., The European Neutrals and NATO, 151–180.

  22. 22.

    Paul Kehoe (Teachta Dála - TD), Dáil Debates. 914, no.1 (21 June 2016).

  23. 23.

    Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen praised these training programmes when he visited Ireland in 2013. See, NATO, NATO and Ireland: working together for peace (speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Institute for International and European Affairs (IIEA) in Dublin, 12 February 2013), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_98369.htm [accessed 20-05-18].

  24. 24.

    Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment (Government of Finland, April 2016), http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=345685 [accessed 06-05-18].

  25. 25.

    Finnish Ministry of Defence, Finn’s Opinions on Foreign and Security Policy, National Defence and Security (The Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2018), https://www.defmin.fi/files/4412/ABDI_2018_Finns_opinions_on_foreign_and_security_policy_national_defence_and_security.pdf [accessed 16-01-19].

  26. 26.

    See Tuomas Forsberg, “Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions,” in Cottey, ed., The European Neutrals and NATO, 100-102; and Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity?” 60.

  27. 27.

    Only the Conservative National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) and the small Swedish’s People’s Party are actively pro-NATO membership. They command roughly a quarter of the seats in parliament.

  28. 28.

    John Henley, “Sweden distributes “be prepared for war” leaflet to all 4.8m homes,” The Guardian, 21 May 2018.

  29. 29.

    David Crouch, “Swedish navy returns to vast underground HQ amid Russia fears,” The Guardian, 30 September 2019.

  30. 30.

    Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2018), https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/28769.pdf [accessed 16-01-19].

  31. 31.

    Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Opinions 2018.

  32. 32.

    The Moderates, Christian Democrats and the Liberals.

  33. 33.

    Magnus Petersson, “’The Allied Partner’: Sweden and NATO Through the Realist-Idealist Lens,” in Cottey, ed., The European Neutrals and NATO, 90.

  34. 34.

    Surveys and opinion polls since the 1980s have also shown a consistently high-level of support for Irish neutrality. A 2013 RED C poll showed that 78% of respondents believe Ireland should have a neutrality policy. See Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) Neutrality Poll conducted by RED C Research and Marketing Ltd., September 2013, https://www.pana.ie/download/Pana-Neutrality-Poll-September-2013-Pie-Charts.pdf [accessed 20-05-18].

  35. 35.

    Karen Devine, “The difference between Political Neutrality and Military Neutrality” (Address to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Public Service Oversight and Petitions, 15 July 2015), 4.

  36. 36.

    Fifty-seven percent of respondents to a poll in 2016 favoured inserting neutrality into the constitution. See Neutrality in Ireland Poll conducted by RED C Research and Marketing Ltd., February 2016, http://www.shannonwatch.org/sites/shannonwatch.org/files/MW_Neutrality_Presentation.pdf [accessed 20-05-18].

  37. 37.

    See: Devine (2006), pp. 116–117; Laffan and O’Mahony (2008), p. 120; Karen Devine, “Irish Neutrality and the Lisbon Treaty” (Paper presented at “Neutrality: Irish Experience, European Experience” Conference organised by the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College, Dublin and Dublin Monthly Meeting [Quakers] Peace Committee, 8/9 May 2009), http://doras.dcu.ie/14898/1/Irish_Neutrality_and_the_Lisbon_Treaty.pdf [accessed 20-05-18].

  38. 38.

    Fifty-nine percent of respondents believe Ireland should be involved in EU defence and security cooperation—see, European Movement Ireland (EMI) Research Poll conducted by RED C Research and Marketing Ltd., March 2018, http://www.redcresearch.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/296918-EU-Movement-Research-Poll-March-2018.pdf [accessed 20-05-18].

  39. 39.

    The Spring 2017 Eurobarometer survey found that while Irish people were concerned for security in Europe in general, they were amongst the least concerned in Europe about their national security. See, European Union (2017).

  40. 40.

    Coakley (2010), p. 63.

  41. 41.

    Reinprecht and Latcheva (2003), p. 439.

  42. 42.

    Ibid, 441–444; and Gebhard (2013), p. 292.

  43. 43.

    Stephanie Liechtenstein, “Why Austria’s response to the Skripal poisoning wasn’t so tough on Russia,” The Washington Post, April 2018. In 2017, as Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Kurz was also involved in trying to ease tensions between East and West over the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

  44. 44.

    Interview with Sebastian Kurz in Security Community (OSCE Magazine, Issue 4, 2016), https://www.osce.org/magazine/292376 [accessed 28-05-18].

  45. 45.

    Party Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), https://spoe.at/sites/default/files/das_spoe_parteiprogramm.pdf [accessed 28-05-18].

  46. 46.

    Party Programme entitled “Austria First”, as resolved by the Party Conference of the Freedom Party of Austria on 18 June 2011 in Graz, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf [accessed 28-05-18].

  47. 47.

    See Nünlist (2018), pp. 194–201.

  48. 48.

    Tresch and Wenger (2017), p. 146.

  49. 49.

    See Nünlist (2018), pp. 194–206.

  50. 50.

    Figures derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf [cited 28-01-20].

  51. 51.

    Government of Sweden, Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020, https://www.government.se/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020 [cited 27-05-18].

  52. 52.

    Barbara Kunz, “Sweden’s NATO Workaround: Swedish security and defense policy against the backdrop of Russian revisionism,” Institut français des relations internationals (Ifri) (Focus Stratégique, No. 64, November 2015), 8.

  53. 53.

    Ministry of Defence, Finland, Security Strategy for Society, 16 December 2010, https://www.defmin.fi/files/1883/PDF.SecurityStrategy.pdf [cited 30-05-18].

  54. 54.

    Online news bulletin of Radio Télévision Suisse (RTS), 10 April 2017, https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/8532695-le-chef-de-l-armee-philippe-rebord-veut-encore-plus-de-moyens.html [cited 21-05-18].

  55. 55.

    Heinz Gärtner, “Austria: Engaged Neutrality,” in Cottey, ed., The European Neutrals and NATO, 139.

  56. 56.

    Ireland’s defence forces are primarily concerned with performing civic duties domestically, while their focus internationally is policy-making, peace-keeping and interoperability. See, Irish Department of Defence and Defence Forces, Statement of Strategy 2016 – 2019, http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/strategy2016 [accessed 28-01-19].

  57. 57.

    Tom Brady, “Urgent bid to increase Defence Forces pay to stop mass exodus”, Independent.ie, 2 April 2018.

  58. 58.

    O’Halpin (2016), pp. 184–186.

  59. 59.

    See, Tom Clonan, “Why it’s time to have an open and honest debate about our neutrality”, thejournal.ie, 15 August 2016; and, Paul Williams, “’Crisis’ in the Defence Forces means our Air Corps are effectively working 9-to-5,” Independent.ie, 19 March 2017.

  60. 60.

    European External Action Service (EEAS), PESCO Factsheet, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en [cited 14-05-18].

  61. 61.

    Letter of Intent of the European Intervention Initiative (E2I), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/535740/9215739/file/LOI_IEI%2025%20JUN%202018.pdf [accessed 04-02-19].

  62. 62.

    See, Tuomas Iso-Markku, “Nordic Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation: The New Strategic Environment as a Catalyst for Greater Unity?” Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) (Briefing Paper, no. 234, March 2018).

  63. 63.

    See Ann-Sofie Dahl, “NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North?”, NATO Defence College Research Division (Research Paper, no. 101, May 2014), 8; Artur Kacprzyk and Karsten Friis, “Adapting NATO’s Conventional Force Posture in the Nordic-Baltic Region”, Polish Institute of International Affairs (Policy Paper, No. 3 (156), August 2017), 4.

  64. 64.

    AWE (name anonymised) (2017), pp. 163–164.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    See Colonel Ronny Modigs, “The Utility of Special Operations in Small States,” in Eriksson and Pettersson, eds., Special Operations from a Small State Perspective, 43–64.

  67. 67.

    US Department of Defense, Directive 3000.07, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=800965 [accessed 15-05-18].

  68. 68.

    Madeleine Moon MP, “NATO Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment” (Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities Report, November 2018), https://www.nato-pa.int/sites/default/files/2018-12/2018%20-%20SPECIAL%20OPERATIONS%20FORCES%20-%20MOON%20REPORT%20-%20169%20DSCFC%2018%20E%20rev.1%20fin.pdf [accessed 04-02-19].

  69. 69.

    Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s examination of 197 conflicts from 1800 to 1998 showed that when small states adopted a different tactical approach to the stronger attacker (typically irregular warfare), they avoided defeat 63% of the time. See Arreguín-Toft (2001), pp. 99–128; Also see, Sandór (2015).

  70. 70.

    NATO, Special Operations Forces, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_105950.htm [accessed 14-05-18].

  71. 71.

    NATO, Three Allies establish Special Forces Command, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_155347.htm?selectedLocale=en [accessed 04-02-19].

  72. 72.

    NATO Centres of Excellence: Analysis and Simulation for Air Operations; Civil-Military Cooperation; Cold Weather Operations; Combined Joint Operations from the Sea; Command and Control; Cooperative Cyber Defence; Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices; Counter Intelligence; Crisis Management and Disaster Response; Defence Against Terrorism; Energy Security; Explosive Ordnance Disposal; Human Intelligence; Joint Air Power; Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence; Military Engineering; Military Medicine; Military Police; Modelling and Simulation; Mountain Warfare; Naval Mine Warfare; Operations in Confined Shallow Waters; Stability Policing; Strategic Communications; and the joint EU-NATO European COE for Countering Hybrid Threats.

  73. 73.

    For example, both states participated in NATO’s 3-day “Cyber Coalition” exercise in 2013 and 2018 to coordinate responses to cyberattacks.

  74. 74.

    Switzerland is a significant contributor to the International Committee of Military Medicine (ICMM) through the hosting of workshops and training courses, and via the International Committee of the Red Cross.

  75. 75.

    See Niklas Helwig, “New Tasks for EU-NATO Cooperation: An Inclusive EU Defence Policy Requires Close Collaboration with NATO,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comment 4, January 2018).

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  1. University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland

    Steven Murphy

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  1. Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

    Anne-Marie Brady

  2. Faculty of Political Science and the Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland

    Baldur Thorhallsson

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Murphy, S. (2021). Friends with Benefits? NATO and the European Neutral/Non-aligned States. In: Brady, AM., Thorhallsson, B. (eds) Small States and the New Security Environment. The World of Small States, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51529-4_11

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