Abstract
Discussions about the United States, China, Great Britain, France, and Russia dominate the contemporary drone debate, yet small states—including Niger, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, and the Seychelles, to name but a few—have also been an active part of the ‘global drone game’. Some small states are looking to acquire their own drones, whilst others are taking advantage of the rise in remote warfare to host secret drone bases for great powers. It is these small state drone bases that are the focus of this chapter, especially the relationship entered into by the United States and Niger in 2013. By utilising the theoretical foundations of ‘shelter theory’, primary interviews, and fieldwork in Niger, the following questions will be analysed: What are the risks for small states when it comes to great power drone hosting? Are there opportunities for leverage, power, security, and status for the small states that enter into such an agreement? Alongside the broader considerations and concerns for great powers that enter into these partnerships, it is the increasing role of small states in the global use of drones that will be the focus of analysis.
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Notes
- 1.
Thorhallsson (2010), p. 216. Also see Bailes and Thorhallsson (2012), pp. 99–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.689828.
- 2.
Delina Goxho, “Foreign Policy: How the EU Can Improve Its Role in the Sahel,” VoxEurop, July 2, 2019. https://voxeurop.eu/en/2019/foreign-policy-5123141.
- 3.
Mick Turse, “The US Military’s Best-Kept Secret,” The Nation, November 17, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-us-militarys-best-kept-secret/.
- 4.
Personal Interview with French Ministry for the Armed Forces (Anon), September, 2019. Also see Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, “The French Turn to Armed Drones,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-french-turn-to-armed-drones/.
- 5.
During 2019 and 2020 Turkey and the UAE joined the list of state powers who host bases in other nations. In this case, Libya became the focus as both nations took conflicting sides in the political and military struggle that plagues the nation. See Dan Sabbagh, Jason Burke, and Bethan McKernan, “‘Libya is ground zero’: drones on frontline in bloody civil war,” The Guardian, November 27, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/nov/27/libya-is-ground-zero-drones-on-frontline-in-bloody-civil-war.
- 6.
Personal Interview with Niger civil society (Anon), September, 2019. Also see, Gordon Lubold, and Jeremy Page, “Laser From Chinese Base Aimed at U.S. Military Pilots In Africa’s Skies, Pentagon Charges,” The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/laser-from-chinese-base-aimed-at-u-s-military-pilots-in-africas-skies-pentagon-charges-1525351775. Also see U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense Press Briefing on the results of the Investigation into the October 4, 2017, Ambush in Niger,” U.S. DOD, May 10, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1518332/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-results-of-the-investigation-into-t/.
- 7.
The UN CEDAW Committee stated that “82% of the Nigerian population lived in extreme poverty”. For a breakdown of the report, see Amnesty International, “Niger 2017/2018,” Amnesty International, 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/niger/report-niger/.
- 8.
Barack Obama, “Letter from the President -- Concerning Niger,” The Office of the Press Secretary, February 22, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/22/letter-president-concerning-niger.
- 9.
Boutellis and Mahmoud (2017), pp. 80–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1331748.
- 10.
“Five Killed by Boko Haram in Niger Attack,” News24, March 26, 2018. https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/five-killed-by-boko-haram-in-niger-attack-2018032. Also see Browne, Ryan. “US Warns of Growing African Terror Threat.” CNN, April 19, 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/19/politics/africa-isis-al-qaeda-threat/index.html.
- 11.
The UN mission in Mali has been plagued by shortfalls in peacekeeping, meaning that additional external military support has been brought in to bolster the military and surveillance capability of the UN. This, it is argued, has created a more ‘robust peacekeeping mission’. For more on the (in)effectiveness and shortfalls of UN Peacekeeping see Rogers and Kennedy (2014), pp. 658–672. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.972035.
- 12.
Here it is important to note that military drones are used by a variety of actors to assist the UN Peacekeeping mission in the Sahel and the French Operation Barkhane. Unarmed German military drones and French military drones (soon to be armed) assist the operations efforts; specifically in Mali and on the border with Niger. For more on the United Nations and the utility of drone to aid in UN Peacekeeping operations see Kennedy and Rogers (2015), pp. 211–227, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2014.991217.
- 13.
During primary interviews in Niger, the term ‘Jihadi Banditism’ was used on a number of occasions to describe the mix of opportunist criminal gangs working in regions under the control of terroristic actors. Personal Interview with Niger Govt Advisor (Anon) in Niamey, Niger. June, 2019. For more on human smuggling see Luca Raineri and Neil Howard, “Human Smuggling: the Pride of Niger’s Economy.” OpenDemocracy, August 30, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/neil-howard-luca-raineri/human-smuggling-pride-of-nigers-economy. For information on ISIS and the broader terrorist drones threat see Rogers, James. “The Dark Side of Our Drone Future.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 8, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/10/the-dark-side-of-our-drone-future/.
- 14.
Alex Thurston, “Niger’s Issoufou Is Everything the West Wants in an African Leader” World Politics Review, September 12, 2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23116/niger-s-issoufou-is-everything-the-west-wants-in-an-african-leader.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, “G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance,” France Diplomatie: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/.
- 17.
Kyle Rempfer, “New in 2019: Two New US Air Bases in Africa Nearing Completion,” Air Force Times, January 4, 2019. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/01/03/new-in-2019-two-new-us-airbases-in-africa-nearing-completion/.
- 18.
Joe Penney, Eric Schmitt, Rukmini Callimachi, and Christoph Koettl, “C.I.A. Drone Mission, Curtailed by Obama, Is Expanded in Africa Under Trump,” New York Times, September 9, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/09/world/africa/cia-drones-africa-military.html.
- 19.
“Niger Holds 13 over Failed December Coup,” News24, January 13, 2016, https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/niger-holds-13-over-failed-december-coup-20160113-2.
- 20.
Eric Schmitt, “A Shadowy War’s Newest Front: A Drone Base Rising from Saharan Dust,” New York Times, April 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/us/politics/drone-base-niger.html.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Eric Schmitt, “American Drone Strike in Libya Kills Top Qaeda Recruiter,” New York Times, March 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/world/africa/us-drone-strike-libya-qaeda.html.
- 23.
Chatham House has stated that the efforts (both military and monetary) by foreign powers have “reduced numbers of migrants” passing through Niger. Quie Marissa, “EU Pays to Stop Migrants.” Chatham House, January 25, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/eu-pays-stop-migrants.
- 24.
The Associated Press, “US Builds Drone Base in Niger, Crossroads of Extremism Fight,” Defense News, April 23, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/04/23/us-builds-drone-base-in-niger-crossroads-of-extremism-fight/.
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Personal Interview with Civil Society Organisation (Anon) in Niamey, Niger. June, 2019.
- 27.
There is a point worth raising here about the French legacy in the country. During fieldwork in Niger in 2019, it became clear from interviews with a number of civil society actors (who will remain nameless for agreed anonymity) that the perception of the French remains very negative in the former colonial nation; far more negative than any other large state operating in the region (including the US). This is something to keep in mind as the French plan to arm their Reaper drones in the country. Personal Interview with Civil Society Organisation (Anon) in Niamey, Niger. June, 2019.
- 28.
Joe Penney, “A Massive U.S. Drone Base Could Destabilize Niger - and May Even Be Illegal Under Its Constitution,” The Intercept, February 18, 2018. https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/.
- 29.
Personal Interview with Civil Society Organisation (Anon) in Niamey, Niger. June, 2019.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Personal Interview with Philippe Frowd, June 6th, 2018. Also see Frowd (2019), pp. 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1660633.
- 32.
President Issoufou calls his reforms the ‘Niger Renaissance Programme’, stating that his ‘administration has worked hard to ensure that Niger is open for business” he said. “We are investing across a number of sectors and looking for strategic long-term partners. The country is northern Nigeria’s most important trading partner and we offer a haven of stability in the region’. African Media Agency, “President Issoufou Presents Niger Renaissance Programme at Economy Series in New York,” AMA. http://mediaagency.com/president-issoufou-presents-niger-renaissance-programme-economy-series-new-york/.
- 33.
Personal Interview with Philippe Frowd, June 6th, 2018. Also see Joe Penney, “A Massive U.S. Drone Base Could Destabilize Niger - and May Even Be Illegal Under Its Constitution,” The Intercept, February 18, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/.
- 34.
Personal Interview with Philippe Frowd, June 6th, 2018.
- 35.
Delina Goxho, “How the EU can improve its role in the Sahel,”VOXeurop. Retrieved from: https://voxeurop.eu/en/2019/foreign-policy-5123141.
- 36.
Personal Interview with Philippe Frowd, June 6th, 2018.
- 37.
The Associated Press, “US Builds Drone Base in Niger, Crossroads of Extremism Fight,” Defense News, April 23, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/04/23/us-builds-drone-base-in-niger-crossroads-of-extremism-fight/.
- 38.
When it comes to American military involvement in the south of Niger against Boko Haram, details become ‘a little hazy’. This is, of course, due to special forces operations—but we know some training of both Nigerian and Nigerien forces in the south-east of Niger and some involvement in the Diffa region. This, according to the NYT, was to counter broadly defined IS affiliated forces. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons, “U.S. Kept Silent About Its Role in Another Firefight in Niger,” New York Times, March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/world/africa/niger-green-berets-isis-firefight-december.html.
- 39.
Personal Interview with Civil Society Organisation (Anon) in Niamey, Niger. June, 2019. Also see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “In the Eye of the Storm: Niger and Its Unstable Neighbors,” Brookings, June 13, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/.
- 40.
As Chancellor Merkel stated during a visit in 2016 “There is a strong link between illegal migration and the trafficking of illicit arms in conflict zones, and we will help Niger to fight this phenomenon by providing Niger’s army with equipment, notably vehicles, other materials and expertise”. “Expanding Assistance for the Niger.” Archiv der Bundesregierung: Expanding assistance for the Niger. Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/2016/2016-10-10-merkel-in-niger_en.html.
- 41.
Personal Interview with Philippe Frowd, June 6th, 2018.
- 42.
US DoD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on the Results of the Investigation,” U.S. Department of Defense, Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1518332/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-results-of-the-investigation-into-t/.
- 43.
US DoD, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on the Results of the Investigation,” U.S. Department of Defense. Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1518332/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-results-of-the-investigation-into-t/.
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
Department of State, “Agreement Between the United States of America and Niger,” Department of State, January 2013. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/205314.pdf.
- 46.
Abdoulaye Massalaki, Phil Stewart, and Matthew Bigg, “U.S. Drone Crashes on Landing at Airport in Niamey: Niger Sources,” Reuters, October 20, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa-drones/u-s-drone-crashes-on-landing-at-airport-in-niamey-niger-sources-idUSKCN0I92CF20141020. Also see, Emily Chow, Alberto Cuadra, and Craig Whitlock, “Drone Crashes Database: 237 of the Worst Drone Accidents since 9/11,” The Washington Post, Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/drone-crashes/database/. And for details on the Seychelles see, “Drone Crashes in Seychelles, Second in Four Months.” Reuters, April 4, 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-seychelles-drone/drone-crashes-in-seychelles-second-in-four-months-idUSBRE83312O20120404.
- 47.
The Associated Press, “US Builds Drone Base in Niger, Crossroads of Extremism Fight,” Defense News, April 23, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/04/23/us-builds-drone-base-in-niger-crossroads-of-extremism-fight/.
- 48.
Joe Penney, “A Massive U.S. Drone Base Could Destabilize Niger - and May Even Be Illegal Under Its Constitution,” The Intercept, February 18, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/.
- 49.
Ibid.
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Rogers, J. (2021). Small States, Great Powers, and Armed Drones. In: Brady, AM., Thorhallsson, B. (eds) Small States and the New Security Environment. The World of Small States, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51529-4_5
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