Abstract
In this chapter, we start analyzing strategic settings where firms interact sequentially, rather than simultaneously, as opposed to most of the exercises in Chaps. 2 and 3. In this type of industries, one (or more) firms choose their output level in a first stage (often referred to as the industry “leader”) and, observing this output level/s, other firm (or firms) respond selecting their output level/s (and, thus, are known as the industry “followers”).
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Choi, PS., Dunaway, E., Munoz-Garcia, F. (2021). Sequential Competition. In: Industrial Organization. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_4
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