Abstract
This chapter explores settings where a monopolist offers two goods to customers who exhibit correlated valuations for each good. For instance, in a market with two consumers, i and j, and two goods, A and B, customer i is the individual with the highest valuation for good A but he is the one with the lowest value for good B. In this context, the monopolist can offer to sell each good, A and B, at a different price or, alternatively, sell the bundle of both goods at a single price. This is the setting that we consider in Exercise 8.1, showing that the firm has incentives to only offer the bundle and make a higher profit than selling each good separately. Exercise 8.2 considers bundling decisions when the valuations for the two products, A and B, are negatively correlated, Exercise 8.3 provides a numerical example, and Exercise 8.4 extend our analysis to a setting where valuations can be negatively or positively correlated. Interestingly, we show that when bundling is only profitable when valuations are negatively correlated.
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Choi, PS., Dunaway, E., Munoz-Garcia, F. (2021). Bundling Incentives. In: Industrial Organization. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57284-6_8
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