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Optimal Strategy in International Relations

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Advances in Simulation and Digital Human Modeling (AHFE 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems ((LNNS,volume 264))

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore the impact of power distribution and international trade on world stability by an agent-based simulation modeling approach. The superiority of using ABM is not only to discover non-linear patterns dynamically, but also to capture uncertainties in order to prevent imperceptible risks, such as global wars. There is a large body of studies attempting to address the cause of wars. Theories in international relations portray the disparate mechanisms of war from various perspectives. In this article, however, I primarily consider two power-based theories, balance of power and power transition theory, and the interconnections among power, trade, and war. Proponents of both sides assert seemingly controversial arguments on the cause of wars. According to balance of power theory, the polarity distribution in power enhances peaceful dyadic relationship between two powerful countries because the superpower states will prefer the status quo and cooperation with their allies. In contrast, the supporters of power transition theory claim that parity and the challenger’s dissatisfaction with the status quo are essential conditions for war. The simulated result, however, indicates that the two theories are comparable as power parity is positively associated with trade. Alternatively, trade is positively associated with interdependence, and interdependence increases both the costs of war and opportunities of waging war. This endogeneity, integrated with the third dimension, time, results in powerful states most likely and ironically avoiding wars with other powerful states. The result of sensitivity analysis unfolds a negative exponential distribution pattern of war occurrence over time, meanwhile, the overall global economy is thriving. The convergence behavior emerges following the substantial cooperative behaviors between states. Based on the results from both deduction and induction approaches, the possibility of initiating war is not the preferred option for most interconnected super states.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Power is an integrated indicator in the matters of population, political capacity, GDP per capita, and social stability.

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Correspondence to Dandan Kowarsch .

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Kowarsch, D. (2021). Optimal Strategy in International Relations. In: Wright, J.L., Barber, D., Scataglini, S., Rajulu, S.L. (eds) Advances in Simulation and Digital Human Modeling. AHFE 2021. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 264. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79763-8_12

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