A reorganisation of the investment protection regime by introducing a two-tiered court system or a multilateral appellate body could offer advantages in comparison to the current system.Footnote 1 In a first step, the expected positive effects of the new approach are discussed. In a second step, the two options of a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM are compared based on the outcomes of the previous discussion.

3.1 Positive Effects of a New Approach

Depending on the design of the system, it appears possible through enhanced institutionalizationFootnote 2 to achieve greater consistency of decisions, to reinforce the independence and neutrality of adjudicators , to improve expedience of investment disputes, to limit costs for the parties involved, to ensure more accessibility for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and finally, to offer greater transparency than in current ISDS.Footnote 3 These aspects are also related to the increased emphasis on the rule of law—according to Articles 2 and 21 TEU.Footnote 4

An international investment court, in the sense of a permanent institutional court, can facilitate streamlined procedures through its efficient organisation. The organs of the court may deliver summons, execute the serving of documents and offer its premises for negotiations and translation services, including simultaneous interpretation. This can also reduce procedural problems which may occur if, for example, the parties prefer not to make use of the services of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Secretariat, the International Criminal Court or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In addition, the MIC proposed here can provide its own procedural rules, adapted to the specific needs of the disputes, and can envisage its own mechanism for the implementation (recognition and enforcement) of its decisions.Footnote 5

3.1.1 Consistency of Decisions

Nowadays, a large number of arbitral awards are publicly available and they facilitate the interpretation of individual clauses of investment protection treaties in future cases.Footnote 6 These awards are often said to be inconsistent—even in cases with identical facts.Footnote 7 Even substantive protection standards with nearly identical wording have been interpreted in a contradictory manner in individual cases,Footnote 8 such as the applicability of the most-favored nation clause to procedural provisions in other IIAs of the host state,Footnote 9 the scope of so-called umbrella clausesFootnote 10 or the attribution of umbrella clauses,Footnote 11 but also rules of procedure, like the possibility of a waiver of rights.Footnote 12 At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that a consistent application of many substantive as well as procedural investment law standards has evolved. This is remarkable considering the lack of binding precedence of arbitral awards, the absence of review through an appeal mechanism and the diverging compositions of the benches of arbitral tribunals. What is clear is that a smaller group of judges, as well as an appeals mechanism can help to prevent inconsistent decisions.Footnote 13 In fact, a standing court with a permanent pool of judges can lead to a higher degree of jurisprudential consistency, even without binding precedence.Footnote 14 In any event, binding precedence could not be based on inconsistent interpretations of or diverging substantive law.

Proper consistency of judicial decisions can only be achieved if a multilateralisation of the substantive law , as the basis of the decisions, is also implemented. Nevertheless, the presence of permanent judges as well as a consultation mechanism between judges of different chambers can prevent contradictory decisions (see paras. 119 et seqq.).

3.1.2 Greater Legitimacy

The current discussion also invokes the question of sufficient legitimacy and control of international dispute resolution. Without engaging in the discussion as to whether this criticism is justified,Footnote 15 it is said that judges can enjoy a high degree of legitimacy at international courts if they have passed a predetermined selection process and have ultimately been elected or confirmed by states.Footnote 16 Therefore, guidelines, in particular those of the Council of Europe, should play a special role when designing a new institution.Footnote 17 This would add to the legitimacy of the judges through the selection process in addition to the legitimacy derived from the international treaty on which the dispute settlement is based.

3.1.3 Independence and Neutrality of Judges

Arbitrators have recently been repeatedly accused of a lack of independence and neutralityFootnote 18 since they are at least partly appointed by private claimants and sometimes act as legal counsel in other proceedings.Footnote 19 In addition, they are often accused of showing an investor-friendly attitude.Footnote 20 The validity of the latter point has not been proven empirically.Footnote 21 Furthermore, the generally applicable International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration Footnote 22 set relatively high standards for the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Notwithstanding these guidelines, these concerns could be further diminished by reforms if judges are appointed by states in advance, independent of a specific dispute, and for a long period of time.Footnote 23 It is generally acknowledged that a permanent court with permanent judges would strengthen independence and neutrality.Footnote 24

3.1.4 Lack of a Control Mechanism

In connection with the independence of the arbitrators, the problem of a non-existent or very limited control mechanism is often mentioned,Footnote 25 which can lead to the above-mentioned inconsistent jurisprudence and lack of control by certain stakeholders. Formally, an appellate body can review erroneous or questionable decisions on procedural or substantive aspects of a case.Footnote 26 The mere possibility of such a review would presumably increase the legitimacy of decisions in ISDS.

3.1.5 Cost Efficiency

International arbitration proceedings may lead to considerable costs .Footnote 27 According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the average total procedural costs (including legal counsel costs) are around US$8 million per case.Footnote 28 Besides the procedural costs in the sense of the term defined in arbitration law, such as costs for the arbitrators, interpreters and secretariats, legal fees and other costs accrued for the representation of the parties, there are also other costs for legal experts and other experts for the calculation of damages. In current arbitration practice, tribunals are hesitant to order a full assumption of these costs by the losing party.Footnote 29

In spite of an increase in arbitration proceedings, investor-state arbitration is not an everyday instrument for redressing violations of investment law due to the high costs of the procedures. SMEs in particular have problems to cover the costs of investor-state arbitration.Footnote 30 In addition, they cannot rely on compensation of their expenses for the arbitration even if they win the case.

Apart from financial risks for the plaintiffs, the high costs are also an enormous burden for developing countries.Footnote 31 Accordingly, it is argued that states have to bear high costs for their defense, which can lead to a regulatory chill even in the event that they win the case. Therefore as a starting point and in the interest of a more efficient and cost-effective procedure, the establishment of an Advisory Center should be considered.Footnote 32 Furthermore, a limitation of the object of dispute, the introduction of a principle of official investigation and by the possibility of imposing a limitation on the ‘necessary costs’ etc. could lead to a reduction of procedural costs.

3.1.6 Access for SMEs

As just pointed out, the question of cost-efficiency is directly related to the access for SMEs to investment protection.Footnote 33 On the one hand, the access of SMEs to investment protection is currently considered desirable.Footnote 34 On the other hand, so-called Third-Party Funding, mass as well as class actions etc. are considered extremely problematic developments in international investment protection.Footnote 35 A new multilateral institution could constitute an opportunity to make institutionalized investment protection ‘more suitable’ for SMEs, for example through cost reduction, access to legal aid and/or procedural support through an advisory center and the acceleration of proceedings. A further possibility would be to allow class actions by SMEs and individual investors with respect to identical claims.Footnote 36

3.1.7 Transparency

The majority of existing IIAs do not require any public access to procedures (even though decisions of the arbitral tribunals are generally published), resulting in the allegation of a lack of transparency dominating the current criticism and discussion.Footnote 37 The Mauritius Convention Footnote 38 adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2014 should ensure greater transparency going forward. With this convention, the UNCITRAL transparency rules Footnote 39 will be extended to existing IIAs.Footnote 40 These rules require inter alia public hearings and the publishing of essential procedural documents (memoranda, decisions) of investor-state arbitration proceedings. To date, the Mauritius Convention has been signed by 23 states (including Germany), ratified by five states (Cameroon, Canada, the Gambia, Mauritius and Switzerland) and entered into force on 18 October 2017.Footnote 41 The European Parliament has also called for increasing transparency.Footnote 42 Possible future models should explicitly take these recent developments in transparency into account in their procedural rules—as was done in the CETA, and planned for in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the EU-Vietnam IPA.Footnote 43

3.1.8 Time Efficiency

The long duration of arbitration proceedings is being increasingly criticised, particularly due to the heavy workload of arbitrators.Footnote 44 Compared to WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (with an average of 15 months for the panel procedure and a further 100 days for the procedure before the Appellate Body (AB)),Footnote 45 current investor-state arbitration proceedings are lengthy—and therefore cause considerable costs. In 2012, ICSID procedures took 5 years on average,Footnote 46 while another study indicates an average duration for investment procedures of 3 years and 8 months.Footnote 47

A permanent bench of judges with far-reaching powers to control the procedures could clearly contribute to the acceleration of proceedings , once the availability of the judges is assured.Footnote 48 Furthermore, the implementation of a maximum duration for specific procedural stages should be considered in this context (see paras. 287 et seqq.).

3.2 Advantages of the Two-Tiered MIC Option

In the current discussion, a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM are principally, and for good reason, considered as alternative solutions. Both options are discussed in the following passages as both could constitute improvements in comparison to the existing system. However, certain arguments speak in favour of a two-tiered court (MIC)Footnote 49 as opposed to a standalone appeal mechanism (MIAM), even if the latter might, according to some literature, be easier to realise.Footnote 50

Some scholars emphasise in particular that a standalone multilateral appellate body would not be sufficient to fully solve the legitimacy crisis of international investment law.Footnote 51

In the long term, an MIC could develop a consistent interpretation of the overall system of investment protection standards and could lead to consistency and thus to legal certainty and predictability of decisions.Footnote 52 Moreover, a particularly important difference of the MIAM solution relates to concerns with respect to ad hoc arbitrators, who are partly appointed by investors; they would still be the ‘first instance’ of such a MIAM system and thus would have the power to decide on the legality of regulations by the state. This, in addition to the varying and thus inconsistent composition of the tribunals’ benches, would remain a weak point, as these are considered to be the main reasons for inconsistency of decisions. The decision-making process of a permanent investment court may therefore be more ‘morally binding’.Footnote 53

Furthermore, a standing appellate mechanism may suspend decisions of the first instance tribunal, if those decisions were otherwise enforceable through the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention (NYC). This possibility of enforcement would likely be forgone when bringing an appeal before the appellate body. Regarding the appellate court solution, there is a risk that an appeals decision rendered by the MIAM would be undermined by its lack of enforceability in states not member to the MIAM.

The WTO Dispute Settlement System is often discussed in the context of the two-tiered solution,Footnote 54 although—on closer examination—the WTO system rather constitutes a mixture of the two alternatives, since the adjudicators of the WTO’s first instance panels are appointed ad hoc, and only after the dispute has emerged and not based on a predetermined composition. However, the institutional and procedural design of both the first instance (panel) and the second instance (Appellate Body) are defined as a whole in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).Footnote 55 Therefore, a full adoption of the WTO System for the resolution of investment law disputes would entail that arbitrators of the first instance tribunal, administered by the MIC, be appointed ad hoc, whereas permanent, full-time judges would sit on the bench of the MIC’s Appellate Body.Footnote 56

Overall, the following chapters on the design of a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM will discuss the advantages as well as the challenges of the implementation of the respective solutions.