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Kant on Recognition

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Abstract

According to Kant, respect is the mode of recognition of others as rational agents, capable of setting their ends and holding moral status. Respect accounts for the subjective experience of morality as the experience of being at the same driven and bound by the recognition of others as equals. In this capacity, respect works both as a moral incentive and as a constraint on deliberation, which derives from the recognition of others as free to choose their own ends.

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Correspondence to Carla Bagnoli .

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Bagnoli, C. (2020). Kant on Recognition. In: Siep, L., Ikaheimo, H., Quante, M. (eds) Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_18-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_18-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-658-19561-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-658-19561-8

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