1. Preface

   • Gordon Tullock

   EditorialNotes Pages: i - ii

2. A simple theory of non-cooperative games with ordinal utilities (1)

   • Duncan Black

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 48

3. Individual interests and collective action

   • James S. Coleman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 49 - 62

4. On the process of budgeting: An empirical study of congressional appropriation

   • Otto A. Davis
   • M. A. H. Dempster
   • Aaron Wildavsky

   OriginalPaper Pages: 63 - 132

5. A pareto optimal group decision process

   • E. A. Thompson

   OriginalPaper Pages: 133 - 140

6. Information without profit

   • Gordon Tullock

   OriginalPaper Pages: 141 - 159

7. Pressure groups and political entrepreneurs: A review article

   • Richard E. Wagner

   ReviewPaper Pages: 161 - 170