1. Collective goods and collective decision mechanisms

   • Richard Auster
   • Morris Silver

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 17

2. The control of politicians: An economic model

   • Robert J. Barro

   OriginalPaper Pages: 19 - 42

3. Pareto desirable redistribution: The non-altruistic dimension

   • Geoffrey Brennan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 43 - 67

4. The institutional structure of externality

   • James M. Buchanan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 69 - 82

5. On the incentives of regulators: The case of taxicabs

   • Ross D. Eckert

   OriginalPaper Pages: 83 - 99

6. A diagrammatic exposition of an economic theory of imperialism

   • Paul Craig Roberts
   • Alvin Rabushka

   OriginalPaper Pages: 101 - 107

7. A note on revenue sharing and the theory of public expenditures

   • Sidney L. Carroll

   Notes Pages: 109 - 116

8. Welfare effects of announcing election forecasts

   • Kenneth M. Brown
   • Charles E. Zech

   Notes Pages: 117 - 123

9. Poll positions and win probabilities: a stochastic model of the electoral process

   • Jerry F. Medler
   • Donald S. Tull

   Notes Pages: 125 - 132

10. The appeal of minimum wage laws and the invisible hand in government

    • Frank G. Steindl

    Notes Pages: 133 - 136

11. Cheating and control

    • Charles Nichols
    • Donald Wittman

    Notes Pages: 137 - 142

12. The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist

    • H. E. Frech III

    Review Article Pages: 143 - 154

13. Reviews

    • Melville McMillan
    • Robert S. Ross
    • Eugene Swimmer

    BookReview Pages: 155 - 165

14. Editorial note

    EditorialNotes Pages: 166 - 166

15. European public choice meeting

    Report Pages: 167 - 167