1. Editor's note

   • Gordon Tullock

   EditorialNotes Pages: i - i

2. An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension

   • John L. Dobra

   OriginalPaper Pages: 241 - 250

3. On the stability of legislative outcomes

   • Stephen A. Hoenack

   OriginalPaper Pages: 251 - 260

4. Why so much stability?: Another opinion

   • Richard G. Niemi

   OriginalPaper Pages: 261 - 270

5. The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence

   • James T. Bennett
   • William P. Orzechowski

   OriginalPaper Pages: 271 - 283

6. The impact of tenure on the flow of federal benefits to SMSA's

   • Lisa J. Kiel
   • Richard B. McKenzie

   OriginalPaper Pages: 285 - 293

7. Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System

   • Neil T. Skaggs
   • Cheryl L. Wasserkrug

   OriginalPaper Pages: 295 - 306

8. The Tiebout hypothesis in the United States: An analysis of black consumer-voters, 1970–75

   • Richard J. Cebula
   • K. Leslie Avery

   OriginalPaper Pages: 307 - 310

9. Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat

   • David N. Laband

   OriginalPaper Pages: 311 - 314

10. On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions

    • Earl R. Brubaker

    Letter Pages: 315 - 319

11. Reply to Brubaker and Tullock

    • Howard Margolis

    Letter Pages: 321 - 325

12. Editorial note

    • Gordon Tullock

    EditorialNotes Pages: 325 - 325

13. Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Comment

    • Dwight R. Lee

    Letter Pages: 327 - 331

14. Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Reply

    • Bruce Yandle

    Letter Pages: 333 - 335

15. Reviews

    • Howard Dickman
    • William C. Mitchell
    • John L. Dobra

    BookReview Pages: 337 - 349

16. Call for papers

    Announcement Pages: 350 - 350