1. On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy

   • Clark Robinson
   • Gerry L. Suchanek

   OriginalPaper Pages: 313 - 335

2. Announcement

   Announcement Pages: 336 - 336

3. Can donations reduce a donor's welfare?

   • Jeffrey H. Weiss

   OriginalPaper Pages: 337 - 347

4. The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation

   • Shmuel Nitzan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 349 - 370

5. A precise restatement and extension of Black's theorem on voting orders

   • Richard G. Niemi
   • Rodney J. Gretlein

   OriginalPaper Pages: 371 - 376

6. Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity

   • Sven Berg

   OriginalPaper Pages: 377 - 387

7. A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

   • Samuel Merrill III

   OriginalPaper Pages: 389 - 403

8. An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections

   • Lee E. Dutter

   OriginalPaper Pages: 405 - 424