1. A general constitutional possibility theorem

   • Peter Bernholz

   OriginalPaper Pages: 249 - 265

2. Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule

   • Norman Schofield

   OriginalPaper Pages: 267 - 284

3. The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach

   • James M. Enelow

   OriginalPaper Pages: 285 - 294

4. Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes

   • John R. Chamberlin

   OriginalPaper Pages: 295 - 313

5. Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

   • Barton L. Lipman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 315 - 331

6. Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms

   • Susan I. Cohen

   OriginalPaper Pages: 333 - 343