1. Introduction: The relevance of public choice for constitutional political economy

   • Charles K. Rowley

   OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 10

2. Positive constitutional economics: A survey

   • Stefan Voigt

   OriginalPaper Pages: 11 - 53

3. Constitutions for new democracies: Reflections of turmoil or agents of stability?

   • Peter C. Ordeshook

   OriginalPaper Pages: 55 - 72

4. Toward a new constitution for a future country

   • Martin J. Bailey

   OriginalPaper Pages: 73 - 115

5. The balanced budget amendment: Clarifying the arguments

   • James M. Buchanan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 117 - 138

6. The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence

   • Michael Munger
   • Thomas Schaller

   OriginalPaper Pages: 139 - 163

7. Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California's state legislative races

   • Kermit Daniel
   • John R. Lott Jr

   OriginalPaper Pages: 165 - 184

8. Choosing free trade without amending the U.S. Constitution

   • Willem Thorbecke

   OriginalPaper Pages: 185 - 200

9. Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation

   • Keith L. Dougherty
   • Michael J.G. Cain

   OriginalPaper Pages: 201 - 213

10. On the (relative) unimportance of a balanced budget

    • Laura Razzolini
    • William F. Shughart II

    OriginalPaper Pages: 215 - 233

11. Public choice in a federal system

    • Jean-Luc Migué

    OriginalPaper Pages: 235 - 254

12. Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective

    • Dennis C. Mueller

    OriginalPaper Pages: 255 - 280

13. Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A european constitutional perspective

    • Jurgen G. Backhaus

    OriginalPaper Pages: 281 - 310

14. Rule and policy spaces and economic progress: Lessons for Third World countries

    • Gerald W. Scully

    OriginalPaper Pages: 311 - 324