1. Majority rule and the public provision of a private good

   • Miguel Gouveia

   OriginalPaper Pages: 221 - 244

2. The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers

   • Jeffrey Milyo

   OriginalPaper Pages: 245 - 270

3. Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House

   • W. Mark Crain
   • John T. Sullivan

   OriginalPaper Pages: 271 - 285

4. Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union

   • Richard D. Anderson Jr.
   • Bernard Grofman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 287 - 314

5. An analysis of voter predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space

   • Tom Tanner

   OriginalPaper Pages: 315 - 334

6. Club theory: Thirty years later

   • Todd Sandler
   • John Tschirhart

   OriginalPaper Pages: 335 - 355

7. Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A public choice analysis of turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives

   • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
   • Kamal P. Upadhyaya

   OriginalPaper Pages: 357 - 371

8. A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

   • Hugh M. Neary

   OriginalPaper Pages: 373 - 388

9. Self-imposed term limits

   • Edward L. Glaeser

   OriginalPaper Pages: 389 - 394

10. The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

    • Jakob de Haan

    OriginalPaper Pages: 395 - 426

11. The Bundesbank's path to independence: Evidence from the 1950s

    • Helge Berger

    OriginalPaper Pages: 427 - 453

12. Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy

    • Toke Skovsgaard Aidt

    OriginalPaper Pages: 455 - 475

13. Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement

    • L. Schoonbeek
    • P. Kooreman

    OriginalPaper Pages: 477 - 486

14. Who wants the euro – and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency

    • Manfred Gärtner

    OriginalPaper Pages: 487 - 510

15. Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E. Wagner, Trade protection in the United States.

    • Thomas D. Willett

    BookReview Pages: 511 - 514

16. Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair division: From cake cutting to dispute resolution.

    • Joe Oppenheimer

    BookReview Pages: 514 - 517

17. John M. Carey, Term limits and legislative representation.

    • Elizabeth Garrett

    BookReview Pages: 517 - 522

18. Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance.

    • James M. Buchanan

    BookReview Pages: 523 - 524

19. Roger Middleton, Government versus the market: The growth of the public sector, economic management, and British economic performance, 1890–1979.

    • Brian Goff

    BookReview Pages: 525 - 527

20. Congress of the European Economic Association, Berlin, Germany, 1998 – Announcement and call for papers

    Legacy Pages: 529 - 530