Negotiation Process Modelling: From Soft and Tacit to Deliberate

  • Tomasz SzapiroEmail author
Living reference work entry


In this chapter an approach to identify the impact of tacit knowledge on the result of negotiation from a mediation perspective is presented. The approach merges different perspectives in negotiation analyses to justify a general framework for identification of tacit knowledge interventions in systematic procedures supporting parties.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Econometrics, Decision Analysis and Support UnitSGH Warsaw School of EconomicsWarsawPoland

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