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Administrative Autonomy of Public Organizations

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Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

Synonyms

Administrative discretion; Agency independence; Bureaucratic autonomy; Delegated authority

Definition

Administrative autonomy refers to public organizations’ ability to determine their own preferences and to translate those preferences into authoritative actions. The concept describes a relationship between an organization and a set of actors outside the organization, most importantly elected officials and executive politicians.

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of what is known about the administrative autonomy of public organizations. Broadly defined, administrative autonomy refers to public organizations’ ability to determine their own preferences and to translate those preferences into authoritative actions (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014). However, public organizations are never completely isolated from other actors within the political system (Wilson 1989). They are part of a chain of delegation from the voters to elected officials to departments (ministries)...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Tobias Bach

Authors
  1. Tobias Bach
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Correspondence to Tobias Bach .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, USA

    Ali Farazmand

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Bach, T. (2016). Administrative Autonomy of Public Organizations. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_143-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_143-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

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