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Motivation-Based Theories of Organization

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Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

Synonym

Incentives

Definition

Incentives, stimuli, influences, or drives that make people work (or not work), or to undertake other actions

Introduction

Theories of organization can ignore neither markets nor motivations. While organizations are common in both the public and nonprofit sector, their origin was in markets. Markets dominate the options available for earning money, and money motivates people to work. Money also motivates the formation of organizations. Williamson (1981) argued that rational agents use organizations to manage tasks when individuals working independently cannot accomplish the task at a lower cost. In this case, an individual (the principal) hires and pays someone else (agent(s)) to help do a task so that the principal profits. But hiring an agent may be risky, especially when tasks are complex or unclear or when the principal fears the agent may know more than the principal. Individuals can contract out complex tasks, but contracting is risky and possibly...

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Correspondence to Laura Langbein .

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Langbein, L., Stazyk, E.C. (2016). Motivation-Based Theories of Organization. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_42-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_42-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

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