Definition
Abuse of public power for private gain.
Introduction
Corruption (i.e., abuse of public power for private gain) is a problematic issue worldwide, but its corrosive effects are particularly prevalent in developing countries. This is true in areas including economic growth (Mauro 1996, 1998), income inequality (Gupta et al. 1998), tax revenues (Ghura 1998), and child mortality rates (Gupta et al. 2000). Policies effective for reducing corruption therefore need to be pursued.
In addressing this, Quah (2007) separates policies implemented in Asia into three categories. First are cases wherein anti-corruption laws have been enacted but no department or body exists to enforce them. Second are when anti-corruption laws have been enacted and there is a department to enforce them, but the bodies are not independent. Third are cases wherein anti-corruption laws have been enacted and an independent administrative body enforces them.
Singapore’s...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Bac M (1996a) Corruption and supervision costs in hierarchies. J Comp Econ 22(2):99–118
Bac M (1996b) Corruption and supervision and the structure of hierarchies. J Law Econ Org 12(2):87–96
Basu KS, Bhattacharya S, Mishra A (1992) Notes on bribery and control of corruption. J Public Econ 48(3):349–359
Carrillo JD (2000) Corruption in hierarchies. Ann Econ Stat 59:37–61
Ghura D (1998) Tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa: effects of economic policies and corruption. IMF working paper, 98/135
Gupta S, Davoodi H, Alonso-Terme R (1998) Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? IMF Working Paper, 98/76
Gupta S, Davoodi H, Tiongson E (2000) Corruption and the provision of health care and education services. IMF Working Paper, 00/116
Mauro P (1996) The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure. IMF Working paper, 96/98
Mauro P (1998) Corruption and the composition of governments expenditure. J Public Econ 69:263–279
Quah JST (2007) Anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries: a comparative analysis. Int Publ Manag Rev 8(2):73–95
Rose-Ackerman S (ed) (2007) International handbook on the economics of corruption. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham vol 1
Rose-Ackerman S, Søreide T (eds) (2011) International handbook on the economics of corruption, vol 2. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this entry
Cite this entry
Sato, H. (2018). Bureaucratic Structure Hypothesis. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_652-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_652-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences