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The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies pp 1–10Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Civilian Control of Armed Forces

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Introduction

The question of “civilian control” or “how to guard the guardians” has been a central issue within the subfield of civil-military relations (CMR), since Plato’s Republicwritten more than 2500 years ago. The states need strong armies to defend their borders, but armed forces strong enough to protect the state also pose a threat to the civilian leadership. Enjoying important political advantages vis-à-vis the executive power such as “a highly emotionalized symbolic status,” “a marked superiority in organization,” and most importantly “a monopoly of arms,” why the armed forces ever obey civilian masters (Finer 1962, p. 6)? How can civilian leaders reliably get the military to obey when civilian and military preferences diverge?” How could the civilian democratic control can be established, enhanced, and assessed? This entry differentiates between the concepts of civilian and democratic control, classifies the research on the basis of the method that they use to measure the...

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fenerbahce University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Tuba Eldem

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  1. Tuba Eldem
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Correspondence to Tuba Eldem .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Alberta, Alberta, AB, Canada

    Scott Romaniuk

  2. University for Peace, San Jose, Costa Rica

    Manish Thapa

  3. Nemzetkozi Tanulmanyok Intezet, Rm 503, Corvinus Univ, Inst of Intl Studies, Budapest, Hungary

    Péter Marton

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Eldem, T. (2019). Civilian Control of Armed Forces. In: Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_11-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_11-1

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-74336-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-74336-3

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