Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers


  • Martin PesendorferEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_669-1


All-pay first-price auction

Bidders submit sealed bids. The high bidder wins the item. In case of a tie, the auctioneer randomly assigns the item to one of the high bidders with equal probability. All bidders (including losing bidders) pay their bid.

Bayesian Nash equilibrium

A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a collection of bidding strategies so that (i) no bidder has an incentive to deviate and (ii) beliefs are consistent with the underlying informational assumptions.

Bidding strategy

A bidding strategy for a buyer is a mapping from the buyer’s signal into bid prices.

Dutch auction

Price falls until one bidder presses her button. That bidder gets the object at the current price. Losers pay nothing.

English auction

Bidders call out successively higher prices until one bidder remains. The item is allocated to the last remaining bidder at the price at which the second last bidder dropped out.

First-price auction

Bidders submit sealed bids. The high bidder wins the item and pays...

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© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK