Abstract
People whose person-making capacities or status are diminished or who lack them altogether are mostly ignored in mainstream theories of recognition. This entry clarifies the conceptual landscape around and some of the key questions about recognition in relation to these people. The concept of personhood is analyzed into three different sub-concepts – juridical, moral and psychological – and the connection of these to recognition on relevant concepts of recognition is discussed.
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Notes
- 1.
For criticism of this conception being too liberal so as to lose from sight the specificity of the concept of recognition, see the entry ‘Anerkennung: Struktur des Begriffs’ in this volume.
- 2.
In practice psychological personhood is not seen as irrelevant for legal personhood: legislators often ask scientists and philosophers questions concerning the psychological (or moral) personhood of limit cases, such as human embryos at different stages of development.
- 3.
See also Quante 2017, chapter 3 for a way of distinguishing between different concepts of personhood (and personality) that differs from the one presented in this entry.
- 4.
See the Preamble (n) to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html), which emphasizes “the importance for persons with disabilities of their individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their own choices”.
- 5.
See ibid. (m), emphasizing the importance of “the valued existing and potential contributions made by persons with disabilities to the overall well-being and diversity of their communities”.
- 6.
For more on this set of issues, see the entry ‘Recognition in Special Needs Education, Inclusive Education and Disability Studies’ by Franziska Felder in this volume.
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Ikäheimo, H. (2020). Asymmetric Recognition II: Humans with Reduced Person-Making Capacities. In: Siep, L., Ikaheimo, H., Quante, M. (eds) Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_66-1
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