Abstract
It is widely thought that recognition is somehow important or even essential for human persons. This general thought comes however in many variations which are what this chapter aims to systematize. Comprehending the several variations and what is rational in them requires, firstly, systematizing the many concepts of personhood present in the various relevant discourses, secondly systematizing the many concepts of recognition present in them, and thirdly grasping the many possible and actual ways in which recognition according to the different concepts of recognition is important or essential for persons according to the different concepts of personhood. Finally, the chapter discusses briefly Fichte’s and Hegel’s theorizing on the connections of personhood and recognition.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For the view that being a person is the same thing as having a “serious right to life”, see Tooley (1972).
- 3.
See the entries on the English, French, and German semantics of the relevant terms in this volume.
- 4.
The upwards direction is important in social ontology. See the chapter on ‘Anerkennung und Sozialontologie’ in this volume.
- 5.
For the general idea that recognition has three main forms or dimensions, see Honneth (1995). I do not follow Honneth in detail however, but try to articulate a further differentiated conception of the various forms of recognition.
- 6.
See the chapter on ‘Robert Brandom’ in this volume.
- 7.
See Brandom (1994).
- 8.
For details, see the chapter on ‘Johann Gottlieb Fichte’ in this volume.
- 9.
- 10.
For Fichte this is actually an undesired implication as it compromises the summoner’s freedom. For the problems involved, see Ikäheimo (2014b).
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Ikäheimo, H. (2020). Personhood and Recognition. In: Siep, L., Ikaheimo, H., Quante, M. (eds) Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_69-1
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