Introduction
Advancing a distinctive integrated legal, moral, and political theory and its corresponding methodology are some of Ronald Dworkin’s major contributions to the field (Flores 2010, 2015; Guest 1991, 2013; Shapiro 2011, 292–306). It is worth mentioning that Dworkin was adamant in his critique of both legal positivism and utilitarianism. At first, following the distinction between rules and principles (1967), he seemed to assume a two-systems view; but as he acknowledged (2011, 402) early on he began to approach the issue from a different perspective, i.e., a one-system view (1972), focusing on the interaction between them. At some point, he reluctantly characterized his theory as a version of “natural law revisited” (1982a). Moreover, he recharacterized it: first, “law as interpretation” (1982b, 1983); later on, “law as integrity” (1986); then, as implying “a moral reading” (1996); and, finally, “law as interpretivism” (2004a, 2006, 2011). According to Dworkin...
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References
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Flores, I.B. (2022). Dworkin, Ronald: Constructive Interpretation aka Interpretivism. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_5-1
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