Skip to main content

Institutions, Coordination, and Leadership

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics ((PASTPRPO))

  • 336 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter contains the theoretical framework the study in this book is based on. Embedded in institutional theory and building on four strands of literature—semi-presidentialism, public administration, political leadership, and foreign policy analysis—it highlights the role of institutions in facilitating successful policy-making. It outlines key concepts and findings from institutional theory before moving more specifically to the incentives that presidents and prime ministers have for engaging in intra-executive cooperation. The specific challenges related to leadership in foreign and security policy, including European Union affairs, are emphasized. The chapter identifies various intra-executive coordination mechanisms and puts forward a theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical chapters.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Bulmer, S., & Lequesne, C. (Eds.). (2013). The Member States of the European Union (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaisty, P., Cheeseman, N., & Power, T. J. (2018). Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective: Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Tocqueville, A. (1990) [1835/1840]. Democracy in America (Vol. I). New York: Vintage Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drent, M., & Meijnders, M. (2015, September). Multi-year Defence Agreements: A Model for Modern Defence? Clingendael Report. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichbaum, C., & Shaw, R. (2014). Prime Ministers and Their Advisers in Parliamentary Democracies. In R. A. W. Rhodes & P. ‘t Hart (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (pp. 517–531). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R. (2001). Cohabitation: Divided Government French-Style. In R. Elgie (Ed.), Divided Government in Comparative Perspective (pp. 106–126). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R. (2018). List of Cohabitations. The Semi-Presidential One. Blog Post by Robert Elgie. www.semipresidentialism.com. Accessed 7 Oct 2018.

  • Finnemore, M. (1996). National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gherghina, S., & Kopecký, P. (Eds.). (2016). Politicization of Administrative Elites in Western Europe. Acta Politica, 51(4), 407–412.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour, J. B. (2002). Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto. The Journal of Politics, 64(1), 198–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldmann, K. (2005). Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism. Governance, 18(1), 35–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodin, R. E. (Ed.). (1996). The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greif, A., & Kingston, C. (2011). Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? In N. Schofield & G. Caballero (Eds.), Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting (pp. 13–44). Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hager, G. L., & Sullivan, T. (1994). President-Centered and Presidency-Centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity. American Journal of Political Science, 38(4), 1079–1103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), 936–957.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegeland, H. (2007). The European Union in National Parliaments: Domestic or Foreign Policy? A Study of Nordic Parliamentary Systems. In J. O’Brennan & T. Raunio (Eds.), National Parliaments Within the Enlarged European Union: From ‘Victims’ of Integration to Competitive Actors? (pp. 95–115). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2006a). Conclusion. In G. Helmke & S. Levitsky (Eds.), Informal Institutions & Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (pp. 274–284). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2006b). Introduction. In G. Helmke & S. Levitsky (Eds.), Informal Institutions & Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (pp. 1–30). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helms, L. (Ed.). (2012). Comparative Political Leadership. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. (2013). The National Interest in Question: Foreign Policy in Multicultural Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Howell, W. G., Jackman, S. P., & Rogowski, J. C. (2013). The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kassim, H., Guy Peters, B., & Wright, V. (Eds.). (2000). The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kernell, S. (2007). Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (4th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Köker, P. (2017). Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lauth, H.-J. (2000). Informal Institutions and Democracy. Democratization, 7(4), 21–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lauth, H.-J. (2015). Formal and Informal Institutions. In J. Gandhi & R. Ruiz-Rufino (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions (pp. 56–69). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazardeux, S. G. (2015). Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Leuffen, D. (2009). Does Cohabitation Matter? French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government. West European Politics, 32(6), 1140–1160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Locke, J. (1960) [1690]. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowndes, V., & Roberts, M. (2013). Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2004). The Logic of Appropriateness (Arena Working Paper 04/09). Oslo.

    Google Scholar 

  • March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2006). The Logic of Appropriateness. In M. Moran, M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (pp. 689–708). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marland, A., Lewis, J. P., & Flanagan, T. (2017). Governance in the Age of Digital Media and Branding. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 30(1), 125–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messick, D. M. (1999). Alternative Logics for Decision Making in Social Settings. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39(1), 11–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2015). Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, D. (2005). Centralizing Advisory Systems: Presidential Influence and the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(2), 181–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (Eds.). (1999). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, W. C., & Strøm, K. (Eds.). (2000). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. (1993). Institutions and Credible Commitment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149(1), 11–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Neal, J. R., Lian, B., & Joyner, J. H., Jr. (1996). Are the American People “Pretty Prudent”? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950–1988. International Studies Quarterly, 40(2), 261–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Passarelli, G. (Ed.). (2015). The Presidentialization of Political Parties: Organizations, Institutions and Leaders. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raunio, T. (2012). Semi-Presidentialism and European Integration: Lessons from Finland for Constitutional Design. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(4), 567–584.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raunio, T. (2016). Refusing to Be Sidelined: The Engagement of the Finnish Eduskunta in Foreign Affairs. Scandinavian Political Studies, 39(4), 312–332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raunio, T., & Wagner, W. (2017). Towards Parliamentarization of Foreign and Security Policy? West European Politics, 40(1), 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rhodes, R. A. W., & ‘t Hart, P. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riggs, F. W. (1988). The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-Constitutional Practices. International Political Science Review, 9(4), 247–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenau, J. N. (1971). The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels, D. J., & Shugart, M. S. (2010). Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf, F. W. (1989). Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(2), 149–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scott, W. R. (2014). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities (4th ed.). London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siavelis, P. (2006). Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy. In G. Helmke & S. Levitsky (Eds.), Informal Institutions & Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (pp. 33–55). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, K. (1990). A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 565–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (Eds.). (2008). Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tavits, M. (2009). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thelen, K. (1999). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 369–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waever, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On Security (pp. 46–86). New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, R. K., & Rockman, B. A. (Eds.). (1993). Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yong, B., & Hazell, R. (2014). Special Advisers: Who They Are, What They Do and Why They Matter. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tapio Raunio .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Raunio, T., Sedelius, T. (2020). Institutions, Coordination, and Leadership. In: Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16431-7_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics