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Institutions, Coordination, and Leadership

  • Tapio RaunioEmail author
  • Thomas Sedelius
Chapter
First Online:
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics book series (PASTPRPO)

Abstract

This chapter contains the theoretical framework the study in this book is based on. Embedded in institutional theory and building on four strands of literature—semi-presidentialism, public administration, political leadership, and foreign policy analysis—it highlights the role of institutions in facilitating successful policy-making. It outlines key concepts and findings from institutional theory before moving more specifically to the incentives that presidents and prime ministers have for engaging in intra-executive cooperation. The specific challenges related to leadership in foreign and security policy, including European Union affairs, are emphasized. The chapter identifies various intra-executive coordination mechanisms and puts forward a theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical chapters.

Keywords

Semi-presidentialism Public administration Political leadership Foreign policy analysis Institutional theory Institutions Formal and informal institutions Coordination Leadership Intra-executive cooperation 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Management and BusinessTampere UniversityTampereFinland
  2. 2.School of Education, Health and Social SciencesDalarna UniversityFalunSweden

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