Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Recognition Versus Negative Liberty

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
Handbuch Anerkennung

Part of the book series: Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften ((SPREFGEIST))

  • 254 Accesses

Abstract

This entry examines the claim that social philosophies centered on recognition are at odds with those centered on negative liberty. Several versions of the negative conception of freedom are articulated, together with corresponding tensions with the promotion of relations of recognition. This initial opposition is then shown to miss several senses in which recognition and negative freedom are actually entwined. Several deep tensions remain, however, which are distinguished in terms of different traditions of conceptualizing recognition.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Anderson, Joel, and Axel Honneth. 2005. Autonomy, vulnerability, recognition, and justice. In Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson, 127–149. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two concepts of liberty. In Four essays on liberty, 118–172. London: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berlin, Sir Isaiah. 1994. Introduction. In Philosophy in an age of pluralism: The philosophy of Charles Taylor in question, 1–4. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, Robert. 1979. Freedom and constraint by norms. American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 187–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making it explicit: Reasoning representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carter, Ian. 1992. The measurement of pure negative freedom. Political Studies 40: 38–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christman, John. 1991. Liberalism and individual positive freedom. Ethics 101(2): 343–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 2000. Foundations of natural right. Trans. Michael Baur. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forst, Rainer. Political liberty: Integrating five conceptions of autonomy. In Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson, 226–242. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gädeke, Dorothea. 2020. Does a mugger dominate? Episodic power and the structural dimension of domination. Journal of Political Philosophy 28(2): 199–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geuss, Raymond. 1995. Auffassungen der Freiheit. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 49: 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Trans. William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1991. Elements of the philosophy of right. Trans. H B Nisbet. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes, Thomas. 2000. Leviathan. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Honneth, Axel. 1999. Negative freedom and cultural belonging: An unhealthy tension in the political philosophy of Isaiah Berlin. Social Research 66: 1063–1077.

    Google Scholar 

  • Honneth, Axel. 2014. Freedom’s right: The social foundations of democratic life. Trans. Joseph Ganahl. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Honneth, Axel. 2018. Anerkennung: Eine Europäische Ideengeschichte. Suhrkamp Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, community and culture. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laitinen, Arto. 2015. Broader contexts of non-domination: Pettit and hegel on freedom and recognition. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18(4): 390–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacCallum, Gerald C., Jr. 1967. Negative and positive freedom. The Philosophical Review 76(3): 312–334.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mill, John Stuart. 2003. Utilitarianism and on liberty, ed. Mary Warnock. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pettit, Philip. 2001. A theory of freedom: From the psychology to the politics of agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John. 1996. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz, Joseph. 1986. The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rössler, Beate. 2005. The value of privacy. Trans. Rupert Glasgow. Cambridge, MA: Polity.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, Quentin. 1984. The idea of negative liberty: Philosophical and historical perspectives In Philosophy in history: Essays on the historiography of philosophy, ed. Jerome B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner, and Richard Rorty, 193–222. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner, Quentin. 2002. A third concept of liberty. Proceedings of the British Academy 117: 237–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spector, Horacio. 2010. Four conceptions of freedom. Political Theory 38(6): 780–808.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Charles. 1985. What’s wrong with negative liberty. In Philosophical papers: Volume 2, philosophy and the human sciences. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Charles. 1994. The politics of recognition. In Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann, 25–74. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ethiek Instituut, Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, Netherlands

    Joel Anderson

Authors
  1. Joel Anderson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joel Anderson .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Münster Philosophisches Seminar, Münster, Germany

    Ludwig Siep

  2. School of Humanities & Languages, The University of New South Wales School of Humanities & Languages, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Heikki Ikäheimo

  3. Philosophisches Seminar, Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Philosophisches Seminar, Münster, Germany

    Michael Quante

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Anderson, J. (2020). Recognition Versus Negative Liberty. In: Siep, L., Ikäheimo, H., Quante, M. (eds) Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_16-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_16-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-658-19561-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-658-19561-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Referenz Sozialwissenschaften und Recht

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation