Axel Honneth’s Recognition-Model

  • Loughlin GleesonEmail author
Living reference work entry
Part of the Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften book series (SPREFGEIST)


A comprehensive innovation in contemporary social philosophy, Axel Honneth’s Hegelian model of intersubjectivity is built upon the recognitive forms of love, rights and esteem, each of which is essential for individual-psychological health and well-being. In addition to considering Honneth’s tripartite recognitive model, this chapter will also focus on its systematic dimensions, as well as the conceptual and methodological developments within Honneth’s thought as a whole.


Axel Honneth Recognition Social Philosophy Normative Criticism G. W. F. Hegel 


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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South WalesSydneyAustralien

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